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Preliminary 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the effect of globalization on the stock of trust in organizations. We present a 
simple model of endogenous trust and show that contrary to centralized hierarchies (pure 
limited liability firms), decentralized organizational structures (cooperatives) foster the 
emergence of trust. We treat organizations as directly observable ‘summary statistics’ for 
underlying trust and ask what will be the fate of trust as the world becomes increasingly 
globalized. Because the cooperative is an intrinsically less efficient organizational form 
and globalization implies harsher competitive pressures, conventional wisdom suggests 
that the viability of cooperatives is in jeopardy. We show that this is not necessarily true. 
If the increase in competition is bundled with an increase in uncertainty and risk, the 
cooperative may become a more efficient organizational form. We conclude that 
globalization does not necessarily erode trust. The case of Mondragón Corporación 
Cooperativa is used to motivate assumptions and illustrate the results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We ask whether globalization erodes trust, as has been commonly asserted by scholars 
and in the popular media.  We do this by building a model in which trust emerges 
endogenously among interacting individuals. Different organizational forms represent 
different levels of underlying trust. We then ask how globalization - modeled as a set of 
empirically defensible parameters – affects the emergence of trust and, therefore, the 
incidence of different kinds of organizations. Thus, we depart from the now common 
approach of surveying individuals about their espoused levels of trust and subjecting their 
responses to analyses under various treatment effects. We resort instead to treating 
different organizations as directly observable ‘summary statistics’ for underlying trust. 
While our approach has limitations, it is at least free from the biases that might 
accompany surveys of trust.  
 
Our model first predicts, simply, that there are higher levels of trust, and greater wage 
equality, in cooperatives (organizations wherein employees own the firm) than in limited 
liability firms, and that cooperatives are more likely to form in situations where there is 
ex ante wealth equality.  We document this to be true in the case of one organization, the 
$8 billion Mondragon Cooperaction Cooperativa (MCC), in the Basque country – a 
conglomeration of cooperatives. Within MCC, we show that the cooperative with the 
greatest degree of wage equality, Irizar, is one of the most globally successful.   
 
More counter-intuitively, we demonstrate that, while cooperatives are intrinsically less 
efficient than limited liability firms, they may nonetheless thrive as globalization 
intensifies.  This is quite in contrast to existing theories which predict that increased 
competition (Hart and Moore, 1998; Miyazaki, 1984) and times of uncertainty (Hart & 
Moore, 1998) – both of which are characteristic features of globalization – will weaken 
cooperatives. Admittedly, globalization is a complex phenomenon; we do it some 
violence by treating it in a rather spare way – as a conjunction of an expansion in market 
size, an increase in price competition (to represent increased competitive intensity), and 
an increase in the variance of performance (conditional on a given level of factor inputs).  
The increased risk, in particular, is instrumental in ensuring the continued viability – 
indeed even the thriving – of cooperatives despite the lower level of profitability of this 
organizational form relative to a limited liability company. Returning to the case study, 
we show that Irizar’s improvement in performance has occurred contemporaneously with 
greater exposure to global competitive forces.  Further, this is the time during which 
greater wage equality has become institutionalized. While alternative explanations can be 
posited – and we consider these at length – our field interviews lend greatest credence to 
the act of cooperation being central to sustaining Irizar’s performance in the face of 
global competition. Thus, our model is consistent with the experience of one of the 
world’s most extensively studied cooperatives (Bonin, et al. 1993; Miyazaki, 1984) and 
contrary to the predictions of extant models of cooperatives.  
 
Our theorizing and case study empirics lead us to the following contributions. First, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom, we do not subscribe to the view that globalization 
necessarily erodes trust, at least not trust as manifested in workplace settings. Second,   3 
scholarly views regarding the (lack of) resilience of organizational form in the face of 
intensified competition should be revisited. Increased competition, in our setting, comes 
bundled with greater instability – while one part of this bundled phenomenon (called 
globalization) indeed erodes the viability of cooperatives and the trust they represent, 
another augments it.   
 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
This section delineates how our modeling of each of ‘trust’ and ‘globalization’ relate to 
popular and scholarly conceptions in the extant literature. We then discuss the rather 
sparse literature on the effect of globalization on organizational structure. 
 
Consider, first, common definitions of trust. The dictionary defines trust as “a confident 
reliance on the integrity, veracity, or justice of another.” Gambetta (1988) claims: “when 
we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the 
probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us 
is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.” To 
Fukuyama (1995), “trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, 
honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other 
members of that community.” 
 
Scholars have diverged in how they treat trust. Economists adopt a standard game-
theoretic conception of trust, essentially asserting that trust can be sustained as 
equilibrium behavior in repeated games.
1 Sociologists suggest that this notion of trust is 
at odds with the intuition that individuals sometimes act in a trustworthy way even in an 
end-game situation. Thus, Granovetter (1999) define trust as “the confidence that another 
will not take advantage of you despite clear incentives to do so, even in ‘end-game’.”   
Our theoretical treatment of trust builds instead on Casadesus-Masanell’s (2000) 
economic treatment of emotions such as guilt, shame, or altruism – emotions which 
underlie the sociologist objection to the standard economists’ repeated game treatment of 
trust.  This model has trust building on the preference structure of individual actors in a 
principal-agent setting, not in response to external inducements. Thus, we adopt a 
theoretical treatment that bridges conceptions of economists and sociologists.  
 
Others have concentrated on examining the effects of trust, rather than its antecedents, 
drawing inspiration from Arrow’s contention that “[v]irtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over 
a period of time. It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic backwardness in 
the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.”  Consistent with this 
contention, Sapienza and Zingales (2002) measure the incidence of trust by the aggregate 
use of financial instruments in a population (checks, deposits, etc. as opposed to cash-
under-a-mattress).  But by far the most popular measure of trust is based on surveys such 
as the World Values Survey (LLSV Aer paper, Fisman and Khanna).  In contrast to this 
                                                            
1 See also Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber (2002).   4 
burgeoning line of work, we rely on our theorizing regarding the endogenous emergence 
of trust to treat organizations as summary statistics for the extent to which the constituent 
individuals trust each other, and treat the directly observable and measurable changes in 
the organization as the signature of changing underlying trust levels. 
 
There is a considerable literature on cooperatives – see, for example, Ward’s (1958) 
seminal paper, Hansmann’s (1996) comprehensive treatment and Bonin et al. (1993)’s 
survey article.  While intuitively cooperatives are thought of as associated with a greater 
degree of trust, solidarity and mutual self-reliance than are limited liability firms, there 
are no explicit treatments of trust in cooperatives of which we are aware. Here we confine 
ourselves to mentioning two theoretical approaches because they illustrate alternative 
means to some commonly held theoretical priors about cooperatives, which our model 
and case study will end up disputing. The first of these is Miyazaki’s (1984) model of the 
evolution of labor-managed enterprises.  His argument is that limited liability firms 
morph into cooperatives in times of trouble – think of employee buyouts of troubled 
firms. The intuition is that, because employees care about job security (whereas outside 
investors do not), an employee owned firm may be content with lower wages (and 
explicit attention to job security) than an outside-investor owned firm (that does not care 
about job security). The lower wages might make the firm viable in times of distress. The 
implication is that cooperatives will underperform limited liability firms, though it is 
important to note that the poor performance causes the cooperative to exist, rather than 
the act of cooperation inducing inefficiency. This model fundamentally articulates a 
‘selection story’ – when do workers self-select into cooperatives. We will argue later that 
this model’s implications are not borne out in our case analytics, nor is there evidence of 
this selection process operating in our case. 
 
A model with a very different engine but with implications for our case study is the more 
recent effort by Hart and Moore (1998). They compare an outsider-owned (conventional) 
firm with a cooperative (owned by consumers). They find different sources of 
inefficiency relative to first-best in each organizational type. The outsider-owned firms 
underproduces, i.e. there are consumers who have a willingness-to-pay in excess of 
marginal cost who do not consume. The cooperative overproduces – the rents in earns are 
used to subsidize overconsumption by cooperative members (at the expense of non 
cooperative members who might value the good higher).  Since the rents used in this 
inefficient subsidization reduce in the face of greater competition, an implication is that 
cooperatives are less likely to exist as competition ratchets up.  Hart and Moore also find 
that cooperatives make more efficient choices when the preferences of their members are 
closely aligned, and thus suggest that cooperatives are a particularly bad structure in 
times of flux.  We will argue, in contrast to this effort, that Mondragon did especially 
well and expanded precisely in times of flux and in times of ratcheting intensity of 
competition. 
 
Next, consider the massive literature on globalization.  One relevant strand is historical 
where the focus is on understanding the extent and nature of movements of finished 
goods and services and factors of production across borders through (typically) the last 
two centuries (O’Rourke and Williamson; Taylor and Obstfeld).  Numerous changes in 
industrial organization are attributed to the effects of various forms of (increases and   5 
decreases in) globalization.  However, others have sometimes contested the importance 
of the effects of such cross-border commerce, relative to intra-country changes, 
particularly technological changes (Feenstra) and political changes (Fairbank on China). 
For our purposes, the main point is to note that this massive literature does not generally 
talk about firms or their organizations; instead much of the theoretical and empirical 
analysis is at the level of the industry or the level of the individual economic agent.  
 
Another relevant strand – tangentially related to the existence of trust and trusting 
societies – has to do with the effects of globalization on the social fabric. Rodrik offers an 
economic treatment of this issue suggesting that some form of redistribution will 
ultimately be needed to compensate ‘losers’ from the rent-reallocation that results from 
globalization, in order to ‘buy’ their support for the process (in an implicitly at least 
partly democratic society).  Chua’s recent book provides colorful, and distressing, 
anecdotal evidence of the distress caused by global forces in individual societies. The 
media itself is full of statements regarding the distress caused by the destabilizing effects 
of globalization (with much of the focus being on destabilizing capital flows – so-called 
‘hot money’). Malaysia, under Mahathir Mohamad, is the poster-child of resistance to 
globalization, often citing that as a multi-ethnic society in (some would say) precarious 
equilibrium, it cannot afford being destabilized by unchecked global commerce.  
 
But there is surprising inattention to the effect of global commerce on firms or on 
organizational structure, despite the increasing acceptance of the greater exposure to 
globalization engineered by (or forced upon) numerous countries (Sachs and Warner, 
1995).   Recently Marin and Verdier (2002) offer a model wherein flatter corporate 
hierarchies and empowerment of human capital are related to increased cross-border 
trade.  But prior to this, Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) and Khanna and Palepu (1999) 
respectively modeled and empirically analyzed the effect of a country’s opening up to 
global commerce on business groups – diversified family-run organizations that often 
form the backbone of the private sector of most economies.  They find that mere 
‘liberalization,’ often equated with dismantling of regulatory red-tape, is insufficient to 
foster competition and force change in corporate structures. As a corollary, one might 
conclude that such changes in corporate structure as predicted by Marin and Verdier 
(2002), for example, probably typically lag by several years – the previous studies 
suggest a non-trivial time period of the order of a decade – the initiation of a process of 
opening up to global commerce. 
 
The spirit of these findings was that organizations might not respond to common proxies 
of increased competition, because the proxies are inaccurate. De jure liberalization and 
opening up to competition is not synonymous with de facto competition, because a 
variety of other institutional arrangements have to come into place before competitive 
forces can operate.  In contrast, here we argue that globalization is a ‘bundled 
phenomenon’ – it rarely comes just as a ratcheting up of competition. It typically also 
includes increases in risk and instability. The crux of our model and case empirics is to 
suggest that the ratcheting of competition and increased instability often have offsetting 
effects on organizational structure and on underlying interpersonal trust. Indeed, in our 
model, there are plausible circumstances when the instability effect dominates, so that   6 
trust, and the kind of intra-organizational coordination that it fosters, rise with 
globalization.  This is interesting precisely because it runs counter to the groundswell of 
literture suggesting the converse.  Nor is this strictly a theoretical conjecture. Our case 
analysis will show this, but prior cases have also shown analogous findings. Indian and 
Chilean business groups tightened intra-group corporate bonds and intra-group family 
ties in response to increased globalization, and did so profitably (Khanna and Palepu).  
 
There is one other circumstance when globalization and cooperative formation co-occur. 
Our impression is that several employee-owned and managed cooperatives were created 
in the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe following the fall of 
communism.  One can interpret the opening up of these economies as greater exposure to 
global forces. But the formation of cooperatives in this instance is not in response to 
globalization (at least not to the greater incidence of competition which we model) – 
rather it appears to be at least partly a means by which capital-constrained individuals can 
begin to come together to engage in productive enterprise in situations with poor external 
capital markets.  
 
Finally, note that our paper considers the effects of (some aspects of) globalization on 
trust. The reverse causality – with which we are not concerned – could also obtain, i.e. 
trust could lead to globalization. This is the engine behind Greif’s theorizing about cross-
border ethnic networks in medieval times.  It is also the aspect emphasized by recent 
attention to diaspora networks (Kotkin, Rauch and Trinidade). 
 
 
 
 
3. The Model 
 
The basic set up is as in Holmstrom (1982).  In the simplest specification there are two 
workers, 2 , 1 = i . Workers exert effort  i a . Output given by  () 2 1, a a f y = , a deterministic 
function of effort levels. We assume that  f  is differentiable and that  0 > i f  and  0 > ij f  
so that more effort implies more output and efforts are strategic complements. There is an 
opportunity cost of effort  () i a c  that we assume increasing and convex. Assume for 
simplicity that  2 1 2 1 a ka a a y + + =  and  ()
2
i i ca a c = with 0 > > k c . 
It is easy to compute the first best level of effort. This is the level of effort that 
would optimally be required from each worker if effort was observable. The first best 
effort ( )
* *
2
* *
1 , a a  solves 
 
() . 2 max i a c y −  
 
The first order conditions characterizing the first best efforts are  () 2 , 1 , = ′ = i a c f i i . We 
use 
* * y  to denote the first best output. 
   7 
Throughout the paper we assume that effort is non-observable. If effort was observable, 
organizational form would be of no consequence as contracts could be used to achieve 
any outcome. Because effort is non-observable, contracts can only be written on total 
output  y . Let () 2 1, α α  be a sharing rule:  y i α  is the payment to worker i. Of course, 
1 2 1 ≤ +α α . 
 
Holmstrom shows that there is free riding for all possible sharing rules: each worker 
considers his own full cost of effort but only a portion  1 < i α  of benefits. The ‘free rider’ 
efforts () 2 1 ˆ , ˆ a a  are obtained by solving 
() i i a a c y
i
− α max  
 
The first order conditions are  () 2 , 1 , = ′ = i a c f i i i α . Therefore, 
* * ˆ i i a a < . Let  y ˆ  denote the 
free-rider output. 
 
 
 
3.1 Social Preferences 
 
We depart from standard economic theory in that we allow the workers to develop 
emotions that may result in trustworthy behavior. We distinguish between material 
payoffs (the true utility function, or the object self) and behavior payoffs (the utility 
function used in acting, or the acting self). Viewing the self as an entity of parts with 
some components making use of others is common in sociology, psychology, and social 
psychology.
2 In The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759, Adam Smith distinguished 
between the object self, the acting self, and the “judge,” who evaluates the agent’s and 
others’ actions. This notion also has been used in economics by Akerlof (1970), Frank 
(1987), Raub (1990), Rabin (1993), and Rotemberg (1994), among others. 
 
Material payoffs refers to the standard preferences: unsocialized, effort-averse, and 
selfish. While the agent’s material payoffs are taken as given, behavior payoffs are 
endogenously generated within the model. Workers play the following two-stage game. 
In stage 1, the workers mold their behavior payoffs to serve best their object self. That is, 
the workers use their selfish utility function to evaluate the desirability of social norms or 
ethical standards. In the case of norms the agents choose whether to feel pressure to abide 
by norms and with ethical standards, they choose whether to develop pressure to abide by 
the standard. We assume that once the agents have chosen their behavior payoffs, they 
are bound to act according to them. In other words, they credibly commit to observable 
pressure. Credibility requires that it be difficult for an agent who is bound by norms or 
ethical standards to imitate the signals that those truly experiencing these emotions 
display.
3 
                                                            
2 See Coleman (1990) for extensive references. 
3 For example, Frank (1987) points out that “[a] strategically important emotion can be communicated 
credibly only if it is accompanied by a signal that is at least partially insulated from direct control. Many 
observable physical symptoms of emotional arousal satisfy this requirement. Posture, the rate of   8 
 
In stage 2, a standard partnership game unfolds. If there is a principal, he offers a contract 
and each worker decides how much effort to exert. If there is no principal, the workers 
decide on effort taking into account the portion of output that they have agreed to. After 
output is realized, the corresponding transfer takes place. 
 
Rotemberg distinguishes a number of interpretations for the first stage of this game. First, 
a selfish inner self relinquishes control of actions to the outer self. The inner self can 
mold the preferences that guide the outer self’s choices. The inner self can make the outer 
self altruistic, bound by ethical standards or norms. Such feelings become genuine 
because the inner self can only change the outer self’s preferences slowly. Second, if 
emotional reactions are guided by genes, natural selection might favor the reproduction 
of individuals whose emotions change in a self-interested way. Finally, natural selection 
favors those genes that lead people to imitate the behavior of individuals that appear 
successful. If people appear successful when their material payoffs are high and the 
parameter values of successful individuals can be inferred from their behavior, then 
people will be led to choose parameters in a way that maximizes expected material 
payoffs. 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Trust 
 
The free-rider problem in the benchmark model is due to moral hazard. Moral hazard is 
unavoidable when effort cannot be perfectly monitored. Larger output and utility levels 
would be achieved if the agents were ready to honor agreements that asked for larger 
effort. Because the workers shirk when guided by their material payoffs (unless 
appropriate extrinsic incentives are granted), we refer to their material payoffs as 
untrustworthy preferences. Therefore, we use the standard partnership framework as the 
no-trust benchmark. We begin by defining trustworthiness. 
 
Definition  A worker is trustworthy if he is expected to exert more effort than what 
material preferences would induce (given an incentives schedule). 
 
Trustworthiness is a matter of degree. It is interesting to relate our definition of trust with 
the sociology view on trust. According to Mark Granovetter (1999), “the most common 
definition of ‘trust’ is precisely the confidence that another will not take advantage of you 
despite clear incentives to do so, even in ‘end-game’.” In the present context, the 
“confidence that another will not take advantage of you” is captured in that when agent 1 
trusts agent 2 not to free-ride, if agent 2 ends up maximizing his material payoffs, then 
agent 1 is worse off than if he had not trusted agent 2. “[D]espite clear incentives to do 
so” is captured in that the object self has always an incentive to breach trust. Finally, 
“even in ‘end-game’,” is reflected in that the model is static and compliance cannot rely 
                                                                                                                                                                             
respiration, the pitch and timber of the voice, perspiration, facial muscle tone and expression, movement of 
the eyes, and a host of other readily observable physical symptoms vary systematically with a person’s 
affective condition.”   9 
on self-enforcement of the type considered in the repeated games literature. We can now 
define trust: 
 
Definition   Agent i trusts agent j if agent i chooses a best response to the effort that 
agent j would take if he was trustworthy. 
 
Notice that trust is defined as behavior and not as the cause of behavior. In other words, 
trust is the taking of an action that best responds to the action of a trustworthy co-worker. 
We do not say that such action is taken by agent i because trusts agent j.
4 
 
 
 
3.2 Organizational Alternatives 
 
Theoretically, we consider two extreme organizational forms, the pure hierarchy (L) and 
the pure horizontal organization (C). In a pure hierarchy, a boss who is the owner of 
capital contracts with workers who get a wage in exchange for their work. The owner 
gets the residual profit after wages have been paid to the workers. In a pure horizontal 
organization there are no bosses and all workers share profit. The pure hierarchy will 
referred to as the (pure) ‘limited liability’ firm. Here we have in mind the old, traditional 
hierarchy where workers are not allowed to participate in decision-making and bosses 
have absolute power, as in Dickens’s “Hard Times.” 
 
The pure horizontal organization will be referred to as the (pure) ‘cooperative.’ This is 
the socialist ideal where everyone contributes to the project and is willing to work 
without externally imposed punishments or rewards. An organization with few layers of 
authority where individuals are given the responsibility to work without direct 
monitoring. These organizations are also rare in pure form. The cooperative (or the 
Ilyrian firm) is a good example of the pure horizontal organization given that in its purest 
form all cooperators are owners and thus there are no bosses.
5 One main extrinsic 
incentive to work in a cooperative comes from the cooperators’ participation in the 
profits of the company. 
 
 
 
3.3 Horizontal Organization 
 
In a workers’ cooperative the workers are owners. There are no bosses. As mentioned 
above, each cooperativist receives a portion  i α  of output, with  1 2 1 = +α α . Since there 
are no bosses, each cooperativist decides how much effort to exert by maximizing his/her 
own utility. 
 
                                                            
4 For a critique of Williamson’s (1993) notion of calculative trust based on the grounds that he does not 
distinguish between trust as behavior and trust as cause of behavior, see Craswell (1993). 
5 We will refer to workers in cooperatives as ‘cooperators.’   10 
We allow the members of the cooperative to develop psychological pressure to abide by 
social norms or standards of ethical behavior if they wish to do so. Thus, cooperativist i’s 
social preferences are 
 
() () i i i i i i i a ca y a u υ υ λ− − − =
2  
 
where υ  is a social norm or ethical standard and λ  (which is a choice variable) is the 
pressure or not (depending on whether  0 > λ  or  0 ≤ λ ) to abide by the norm or ethical 
standard. An example of an ethical standard is, 
* *
i i a = υ  the first best level of effort and 
() i i i a a = υ . This is an ethical standard because it is non-observable. Parameter  0 > i λ  
represents worker i’s personal pressure to abide by the ethical standard. An example of a 
social norm is 
* * y = υ  the first best level of output. In this case,  () ( )
* * , j i i i a a f a = υ . This 
is a social norm because output is assumed to be observable. In this case,  i λ  represents 
how much the agent cares about others observing the difference between the norm and y. 
In what follows we assume that 
* *
i i a = υ  the first best level of effort and  () i i i a a = υ . It is 
important to stress that  i λ  is chosen by the agent and thus it can be positive, negative, or 
zero. 
 
In the first stage, the cooperativists shape their preferences by choosing () 2 1, λ λ  
simultaneously. The choice is made to maximizing the workers’ material payoffs 
(unsocialized payoffs that do not include pressure to abide by social norms or standards 
of ethical behavior): 
 
2
i i i ca y u − =α  
 
In the second stage, the cooperativists choose effort ( )
c c a a 2 1,  simultaneously by 
maximizing their ‘behavior’ payoffs (2). These are socialized payoffs. It is easy to see 
that: 
 
Proposition 3 Given  i
c
i i i a a a ˆ ,
* * > > α  and 0 > i λ  
 
The cooperativists develop pressure to abide by social norms or ethical standards. The 
reason is that efforts are strategic complements and thus forcing oneself to work a little 
harder also induces the other cooperativist to work harder.
6 
 
In equilibirum there is some free-riding but less than in the standard model where 
workers are not allowed to develop internal pressure to abide by social norms or 
standards of ethical behavior. The pressure to abide by the standard results in ‘intrinsic’ 
incentives to work. Extrinsic incentives (the commission rate) increase the material 
                                                            
6 In fact,  0 < i λ  when efforts are strategic substitutes. But in this case, there is no reason to set up the 
organization because  () ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 , 0 0 , , a f a f a a f + < . 
(2)   11 
wealth of the worker. Intrinsic incentives are ‘built in’ the preferences. When  0 > i λ  
failure to perform up to the social norm or personal standard results in feelings of shame 
or guilt, respectively. Notice finally that overachieving (in the sense of working harder 
than the social norm or standard of ethical behavior) results of feelings such as pride and 
or self-esteem. 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Trust 
 
We interpret the reduction of free-riding due to social norms or ethical standards as 
trustworthiness. Cooperativists trust each other to choose  i
c
i a a ˆ >  because they know that 
social norms and standards of ethical behavior are at play. Thus, 
 
Proposition 4 The cooperative fosters trust. 
 
Below we present the case study of Irizar, a cooperative with a flat organizational 
structure, that displays high trust levels. 
 
 
3.3.2 Wage Equality 
 
If we add one more stage and let the cooperativists choose the sharing rule () 2 1, α α  
through negotiation (with equal negotiating power), the workers choose  2
1
2 1 = =α α . 
Thus, 
 
Proposition 5 The cooperative promotes wage equality. 
 
It is interesting to note that not only wage equality maximizes output but that it also 
maximizes trust. We now turn to the limited liability firm. 
 
 
3.4 Hierarchy 
 
In the limited liability model, there is an owner-boss and two workers. The owner has 
sufficient capital to set up the firm. The workers exert effort 
L
i a  and the boss designs an 
incentives scheme. The boss keeps the residual product after the workers have been 
compensated for their effort. 
 
The best contract the owner can offer is as follows. Workers get wage  () ( )
* * a c y w i =  as 
long as 
* * y y = , otherwise  () 0 = y w . This ensures that workers choose 
* * a a
L = .  The 
boss makes more money than the cooperativists in the previous section. Thus, the 
capitalist is better off setting up a limited liability firm than a cooperative. However, 
workers’ utility is lower in a limited liability firm.   12 
 
3.4.1 Trust 
 
Just as in the cooperative model, we let the workers develop pressure to abide by 
standards of ethical behavior or social norms. In the case of the limited liability firm, 
however, the workers have no incentive to develop pressure to abide by standards of 
ethical behavior or social norms. The reason is that if they choose  0 > λ , then 
 
() () () a a c w υ υ λ− + =  
 
at 
* * a a = . But this is  ( )
* * a c w =  which is independent of λ . Thus, the first stage 
maximization involves no λ . Pressure cannot affect the willingness of the other party to 
work harder and each worker has no incentive to become trustworthy. 
 
Proposition 6 The limited liability company discourages trust. 
 
 
3.4.2 Wage Equality 
 
Wages in the limited liability firm are unequal. The owner-boss gets  ( ) 0 2
* * * * > − a c y  
whereas the workers get  ( )
* * a c w =  which is just sufficient money to compensate for their 
effort. Clearly, the workers would be better off by setting up a cooperative (if they had 
the assets) because in a cooperative they would get strictly positive utility. Further wage 
inequality would be introduced if there were differences of ability. 
 
 
3.5 The Emergence of Cooperatives 
 
An important question that needs to be addressed at this point is: given that cooperatives 
are less efficient than limited liability firms, why do they exist? There are two parts to the 
question: first, what are the incentives to set up cooperatives? And second, will 
cooperatives survive in competition with limited liability firms? 
 
The model suggests a way to answer the question. Suppose an individual with wealth that 
is insufficient to set up a firm. He has three options. First, he can team up with another 
individual who has some capital and set up a cooperative. He would then be a 
cooperativist and, according to the model, would achieve positive utility. Second, he 
could decide not to use his wealth and join a limited liability firm and work for a wage. 
The model suggests that this is not attractive as he will be paid the opportunity cost of 
labor only. Third, he can team up with someone else and set up a limited liability firm. 
This results in higher payoff than setting up a cooperative. But this is only possible if 
there are individuals willing to join the limited liability firm as wage workers. In the 
absence of such individuals, cooperatives will be formed in all likelihood. Thus, in social 
groups with income equally spread, we should expect cooperatives to thrive. In settings 
with wage inequality, limited liability firms will be formed.    13 
 
Cooperatives are more likely to survive in the long run if competitive pressures are 
relatively mild. If there are barriers to entry, established but relatively inefficient 
cooperatives may survive. The model suggests, however, that if one main consequence of 
globalization is the increase in competitive pressure, cooperatives are fated to perish. We 
will come back to this question in the section on globalization. 
 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
Contrary to the limited liability firm, the cooperative promotes trust and has a more 
egalitarian wage structure. In the limited liability firm, the owner keeps the residual 
product. Workers are generally better off in cooperatives than in limited liability firms. 
However, the limited liability firm is efficient and the cooperative has some slack that 
results in lower than efficient output. In addition, cooperatives are more likely to emerge 
in settings where wealth is equally spread. 
 
In the next section we present the case study of Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa to 
illustrate the propositions. The case is also used to motivate our subsequent modeling and 
analysis of globalization. 
 
 
4. Case Study: Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa 
 
The case of Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa (MCC) illustrates the propositions 
regarding horizontal organizations made above.
7 MCC is particularly interesting given 
the process of internationalization that the corporation has been undergoing in the past 
few years. We come back to the example after we extend the model to embody some of 
the main consequences of globalization. 
 
MCC was a conglomerate of more than 100 industrial cooperatives with products as 
diverse as kitchen appliances, elevators, automobile components, sports equipment, 
machine tools, financial services, retail distribution, and education. The company was 
founded in 1956 by priest-entrepreneur Father José María Arizmendiarrieta in northern 
Spain’s Basque Country. With 2001 sales exceeding €7 billion and a workforce of 
55,000, the corporation had grown to become the 10th largest industrial group in Spain 
and the largest with exclusively Spanish capital. Several of the component cooperatives 
were regularly awarded for their excellence in quality-management, and MCC’s main 
research arm, Ikerlan, had collaborated in prominent R&D ventures such as the Columbia 
space shuttle project for NASA. 
 
In 1956 Arizmendiarrieta together with five former students from his Eskola Politeknikoa 
founded Ulgor, the first of MCC’s cooperatives. Ulgor manufactured space-heating 
stoves and paraffin cooking appliances. The company quickly enlarged its product 
portfolio to include electrical products and butane-fired cookers. Accoding to one of the 
                                                            
7 See Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Tarun Khanna (2002) and references therein.   14 
founders: “At that time it was clear to us that any firm that could produce a useful and 
well-made product would succeed.” In fact, the Spanish competitive environment was 
one of mild rivalry. Spain was an autarky and imports were for the most part forbidden 
and there was a significant unmet demand. 
 
The five students decided to form Ulgor after their unsuccessful attempt to introduce 
worker participation in the dominant limited liability firm in town, the Unión Cerrajera, a 
metal working company. The necessary capital to set up Ulgor came from the founder’s 
savings and the support of villagers. Thus, dissatisfaction with work conditions in the 
limited liability firm prompted the emergence of the cooperative. Of course, this is 
consistent with the model prediction that cooperativists achieve larger utility than 
workers of the limited liability firms. It is also interesting to point out that in the mid-
1950s wealth was reasonably equally spread in the Mondragón area. Father 
Arizmendiarrieta coordinated joint action in the Mondragón area and encouraged the 
formation of cooperatives.
8 
 
Soon after Ulgor was set up, other independent cooperatives sprung in the Mondragón 
area. These cooperatives established close ties among them. The cooperatives faced three 
main problems: access to capital and managerial expertise, exclusion from the Spanish 
Social Security System, and a deficient technological base. These problems triggered the 
creation of several new institutions. To deal with the problem of reduced access to 
financial resources and the lack of social security, the cooperatives created a cooperative 
bank, Caja Laboral Popular (CLP), and an insurance cooperative, Lagun Aro, that would 
offer social security services to the members of the affiliated cooperatives. CLP acted as 
a center for all the cooperatives adhered to the group. Soon after its creation, CLP 
instituted a business development division to promote new cooperatives, consolidate and 
coordinate the activities of the existing cooperatives, and to provide managerial expertise 
to troubled cooperatives. In fact, several cooperatives were born by the initiative of the 
CLP.The Spanish economy became much more open in the 1960s. As a consequence, 
1965-1975 was a period of great expansion at Mondragón.  More interesting is the fact 
that while in the early and mid 1990s GDP growth slowed (it became negative in 1993) 
and unemployment reached 23%, MCC experienced larger than 14% and 4% average 
growth in sales and employment, respectively. The following graph shows Spain’s GDP 
growth and MCC’s sales growth trends for the periods 1970-1989 and 1990-2000. 
MCC’s sales growth is always above that of Spain’s GDP. Interestingly, MCC’s sales 
trend is upward sloping in the 1990s, reflecting the group’s internationalization efforts. 
                                                            
8 An important precedent to MCC in the Basque Country was Alfa, Sociedad Anónima Cooperativa 
Mercantil y de Producción de Armas de Fuego (Cooperative Corporation for Marketing and Manufacturing 
Fierarms). Alfa was set up in October 28, 1920 by a group of seven workers who were dissatisfied with 
work conditions in limited liability firms in the metallurgy sector. After a long strike, the workers pooled 
their assets ($2,000 approximately) and founded Alfa. The idea was to set up a cooperative to manufacture 
and market firearms with quality and prices comparable to those of limited liability firms, but where wages 
would be higher than those offered by limited liability firms. By 1925, however, Alfa’s firearms were no 
longer cost-competitive. Alfa shifted operation to the manufacture of sewing machines, a less competitive 
industry at the time. The Alfa case shows that workers in traditional limited liability firms get less utility 
than what they can realize in the perhaps less efficient cooperative. The case is also consistent with the 
cooperative not being as efficient as the limited liability firm in low risk environments.   15 
However, Spain’s GDP growth has continued the downward trend of the previous two 
decades. 
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4.1 Irizar 
 
We turn now to illustrating Irizar, one of the most successful cooperatives in the group 
Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa. Irizar’s organizational structure is completely flat, 
with no bosses and organized through self-managed teams. 
 
A member of MCC’s Industrial Equipment division, Irizar was a manufacturer of luxury 
long- and medium-distance coach bodies located in Ormaiztegi, a small Gipuzkoan town 
close to Mondragón. The company started in 1889 as a limited liability firm that 
manufactured wooden carriages and stagecoaches. In 1962 Irizar became a cooperative 
and joined the Mondragón Cooperative Group (the predecessor of MCC). After joining 
Mondragón and gaining access to financial resources, Irizar extended its product line to 
cover the full product spectrum from luxury coaches to city buses. The company served 
five European countries only. Throughout the 1980s the industry became increasingly 
competitive and by 1991, after a sequence of false moves and misfortunes, Irizar was on 
the verge of bankruptcy. 
 
As a last recourse to save the company, MCC’s council named a new general manager for 
Irizar, Mr. Koldo Saratxaga, an executive with vast experience in managing cooperatives. 
Under Saratxaga’s management, Irizar’s progress was spectacular. While in 1991 the 
company had sales of €18.6 million (18% exports), loses of €5.4 million, 275 workers, 
and output of 226 coaches a year, in 2000 sales were €168 million (65% exports in 45 
countries), it employed over 600 workers in its Ormaiztegi plant alone, and it produced 
more than 1,400 custom-made, luxury coaches per year. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, Irizar received several prizes for managerial excellence and 
product quality. The company became the first luxury coach maker to achieve ISO 9001   16 
and ISO 14001 certifications. Irizar was also the first Spanish company not in a 
multinational group to receive the European Quality Prize granted by the European 
Foundation for Quality Management, the most prestigious European prize to the 
management of quality. In 2000, Irizar was Europe’s second-largest manufacturer of 
luxury coaches and according to ‘The Economist:’ “[Irizar] is probably now [year 2000] 
the most efficient coachbuilder in the world.”
9  The Irizar case demonstrates that a 
cooperative may be as efficient as a limited liability firm. 
 
4.1.1 Trust and Teamwork at Irizar 
 
Mr. Saratxaga redefined the product and organizational strategies of Irizar. The new 
product strategy was simple: instead of offering a large product selection to a small 
geographic market (five countries), he proposed to specialize in one product segment, the 
luxury long- and medium-distance coach bodies, and to offer it to multiple geographic 
markets (45 countries by year 2000). The new strategy contained the seed of 
internationalization. 
 
As fundamental as the new product strategy was the revised organizational strategy. 
According to Saratxaga, 
 
Irizar is a project based on the freedom and responsibility of all its participants. 
Irizar knows no control or hierarchy. There is personal responsibility and the thrill 
to share experiences. This fosters the flow of knowledge within and between self-
managed teams. Only those who assume the business project as their own will 
truly be trustworthy and motivated. 
 
The company had no hierarchy: there were direct workers and coordinators (not 
directors) and strategic decisions were taken by as many people as possible. Words such 
as ‘employee,’ ‘worker,’ ‘wage-earner’ were not in Irizar’s vocabulary. The absence of a 
formal hierarchy is a reflection of the trust in the attitude and motivation of Irizar’s 
employees. According to Iñaki Zuloaga, mechanic: 
 
We operate perfectly well without foremen or bosses, and responsibility is shared 
100%. There are really close relations between the production line and 
engineering, which enables objectives to be met and the customer to be satisfied. 
We have improved cycle times, we work more comfortably, we are better trained 
and we have much more initiative than before. We are much more involved with 
the Project and much more committed. 
 
The team was the basic unit from which Irizar’s organization was built. There were teams 
for all types of tasks and processes and most people belonged to several teams 
simultaneously. Each team had a nominated ‘leader’ (not to be called ‘boss’ or ‘director’) 
and had a great degree of autonomy; teams acted as mini, semi-independent firms. There 
were more than 180 teams and 140 leaders. Iñaki Alonso, a shop-floor person who was 
also a team leader observed: 
                                                            
9 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2000).   17 
 
You don’t need a supervisor, and having no intermediaries helps communication 
right along the line. The skills you acquire through working this way are helpful 
to you outside work as well. It is all about relationships and trust. It is better to 
use your brain, solve your own problems and to make that part of your daily 
routine. 
 
Teams were reviewed at least once a year to ensure their efficiency. Mr. Saratxaga led the 
‘steering team.’ His fellow steering team members were called ‘executive coordinators.’ 
According to Saratxaga: ‘Higher level posts signify greater responsibility, or greater 
competency, or a wider range of coordination, but never represent authority.’ Irizar had 
no departments. Offices and shop-floor spaces had no physical walls. According to the 
1999 employee satisfaction survey, 95% of the workforce thought that the actions of their 
leaders merited their trust, up from 83% in 1995. 
Teams had the freedom to organize their activities as they saw most fit. This included 
deciding when to start and end work and how to perform the job they were supposed to 
do each day. There was no clocking-in and clocking-off on the shop floor. The only 
requirement was that where there were synchronization requirements with other teams 
these had to be resolved ahead of time through dialogue. According to Saratxaga, 
 
Many people say this is a ‘no rules’ company. To a degree this is true. We have 
tried to create an environment where people spend a lot of time thinking about 
what needs be done to please the customer, not 80% of the time thinking how to 
control other people. 
 
Work targets were agreed through democratic consensus. About 80% of Irizar’s 
personnel contributed to the setting of annual targets. 
 
4.1.2 Wage Equality and Participation in Profits 
 
The pay scale at Irizar was amongst the flattest in MCC. Irizar’s maximum post-tax pay 
ratio was 1:3 (highest to lowest wage). According to Saratxaga: “Because everyone likes 
success and power, at Irizar we all share success and power and we eliminate hierarchy.” 
 
Most of the workforce in the Ormaiztegi (Gipuzkoa) plant owned equity in the enterprise. 
New personnel were given a three-year probation period, and after positive evaluation by 
peer team members, they had the right to become full partners. Irizar’s general assembly 
met three times a year (most other MCC’s cooperatives held the general assembly once a 
year) and always recorded close to 100% attendance. A recent decision taken by the 
general assembly was to abolish supplementary payment for overtime. 
 
Irizar paid worker-shareholders 7.5% of salary as liquid dividend. Ploughed back 
dividends increased steadily since 1993. 
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5. Globalization 
 
Globalization has three effects: an increase in market size, an increase in the strength of 
competition, and an increase in risk. The increase in market size results in the need to add 
more workers to the organization so that new demand can be met; the increase in 
competition means that less efficient organizations are more likely to perish; and the 
increase in risk places constraints on the kinds of incentive schedules that the firm is able 
offer. 
 
We now investigate whether globalization bring cooperatives to an end, the likely pattern 
of expansion for limited liability firms and cooperatives, and whether or not globalization 
will result in lower levels of trust. 
 
5.1 Will Globalization Bring Cooperatives to an End? 
 
Because globalization results in higher competitive pressure, we could conclude that 
cooperatives are less likely to survive in a globalized world because it is a less efficient 
organizational form than the limited liability firm. We now show that this is not 
necessarily true. If the added risk brought about by globalization is large, there are 
circumstances in which the cooperative may do better than the limited liability firm. 
 
5.1.1 Risk 
 
We now show that if the output is random, then the cooperative may do better than the 
limited liability firm. If there is risk, then the limited liability firm may not be able to 
implement the first best outcome. Further, we show that under sufficient risk the 
cooperative may be more efficient than the limited liability firm. 
 
Risk is modeled by introducing randomness on the output. After the agents have taken 
action vector () 2 1, a a , the outcome is 
 
υ ~ ~ + = y y  
 
where υ ~ is a random variable taking values  H υ  and  L υ  ( L H υ υ> ) with probabilities  p  
and  p − 1 , respectively. We let  2
1 > p . We assume risk neutrality and  0 ~ ≥ y E  so that it is 
ex ante profitable to engage in production. We say that ‘risk is positive’ if  0 ~ ≥ υ E  and 
‘negative’ otherwise. Positive risk refers to positive random shocks to output. Negative 
risk refers to negative random shocks.  In what follows, we analyze the performance of 
the cooperative and the limited liability firm with risk. 
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5.1.2 Horizontal organization 
 
The analysis and results here are just as in the certainty benchmark of Section 2,  0 > i λ  
and  i
c
i a a ˆ > , there is equilibrium trust and wage equality. Because  0 ~ ≥ y E  the 
cooperativists are willing to enter the relationship. 
 
5.1.3 Hierarchy 
 
A version of the scheme under certainty will work if workers and/or the owner has 
sufficient wealth. However, if the variance of υ ~ is large and the workers and owner are 
wealth-constrained, then the limited liability firm may not be able to implement the first 
best. 
 
Because the random variable takes two values only, there are three outcomes of interest: 
( ) ( ) L L H H a a f y a a f y υ υ+ = + =
* *
2
* *
1
* *
2
* *
1 , , , , and  y  other than  H y  and  L y . The workers 
can make sure that either  H y  or  L y  will be realized by choosing 
* *
1 a  and 
* *
2 a .  However, 
there are effort levels () 2 1, a a  with 
* *
i i a a < such that 
 
() ( ) L H a a f a a f υ υ+ = +
* *
2
* *
1 2 1 , ,  
 
Thus, the agents can choose to work less than 
* * a  and then attribute a low output 
() H a a f υ + 2 1,  to bad luck. Of course, if the realized output is  () L a a f υ + 2 1,,  t h e  
principal will know with certainty that the agent shirked. 
 
The principal offers three payments  H w ,  L w , and w corresponding to each output level. 
The incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are 
 
() ( ) ()() a c w p pw a c w p pw L L H − − + ≥ − − + 1 1
* *  
 
and 
 
() ( ) 0 1
* * ≥ − − + a c w p pw L H . 
 
Finally, the principal minimizes the expected payment 
 
{} () L H w w w w p pw
L H
− + 1 min
, ,  
 
Observe first that the principal would like to set w as low as possible because outputs 
associated with w are never desirable. In fact, if the agents are not wealth-constrained, 
the principal would choose  H w  and  L w  so that  () ( )
* * 1 a c w p pw L H = − +  and w low 
enough so that the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. Such constraint has the   20 
minimum possible expected cost to the principal and implements 
* * a . The workers are 
left with zero expected utility. 
 
However, if the agents are wealth-constrained then the smallest possible value of w is 0. 
In this case, if the principal is not wealth-constrained, he can set  0 = = L w w  and  H w  
large enough so that the participation constraints are satisfied. This contract will again 
induce the agents to choose the first best efforts. The expected cost to the principal is the 
same as in the contract with low w; the workers are left with zero expected utility. To 
summarize, 
 
Proposition 7 Without budget constraints (firm and/or  workers), the limited liability 
firm is able to implement the first best action at the lowest possible cost. 
 
Notice also that trust will not emerge here. In equilibrium we have that 
* * a a =  and thus 
the pressure function is zero. Therefore, there is no value to setting  0 > λ . Finally, wages 
(in expected terms) are unequal: the workers get zero expected utility whereas the 
principal makes a strictly positive amount of money. 
 
If the firm or workers do not have unlimited wealth, the budget constraints are 
 
0 0 ≥ ≥ L H w w and 0 ≥ w  
 
and 
 
( ) ( ) L L H H a a f w a a f w υ υ+ ≤ + ≤
* *
2
* *
1
* *
2
* *
1 , ,a n d () L a a f w υ + ≤ 2 1, 
 
It is easy to see that in this case the feasible set may be empty. Thus, there may be no 
contract that resutls in the workers choosing ( )
* *
2
* *
1 , a a . See graph 1. The factors that 
favor the implementability of ( )
* *
2
* *
1 , a a  are: 
 
•  Large expected value of  y ~. In this case the budget constraints are less likely to be 
binding. In particular, if  H υ  is sufficiently large, then ( )
* *
2
* *
1 , a a  is implementable. 
 
•  p  close to 1. When  p  is close to 1, the variance of output ( () ( )
2 1 L H p p υ υ− − ) is 
small and the information problem is less severe.  
 
•  Small difference between  ( )
* * a c  and  () a c .  When  ( )
* * a c  is close to  () a c , the 
incentives problem is less severe and thus it is easier to implement ( )
* *
2
* *
1 , a a .  
 
•  Large difference between 
* * y  and  ( )
* * a c . In this case the budget constraint is less 
likely to be binding. 
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Suppose that the workers cannot be induced to choose ( )
* *
2
* *
1 , a a , what can the limited 
liability firm implement? If the incentives problem is sufficiently severe,
10 the only 
implementable efforts through the scheme presented above are () 2 1, a a . 
 
If the ‘forcing’ contract is not a possibility, the principal can always offer a commission 
contract by which the agents get  y 1 α  and  y 2 α  and the principal keeps () y 2 1 1 α α− − . In 
this case, the agents will develop some trust (but less than in the cooperative because 
2
1 < i α ) and the limited liability firm will do worse than the cooperative.  Thus, 
 
Proposition 8   With risk and wealth constraints, the cooperative may do better than the 
limited liability firm. 
 
The limited liability firm provides incentives to work through monetary compensation 
only. The structure of the optimal compensation contracts in the limited liability firm 
does not promote the emergence of trust and intrinsic motivation. The lack of intrinsic 
incentives is not problematic under of certainty because compensation schemes can be 
tailored exactly so that the ex post available financial resources will be sufficient to honor 
such contracts. Proposition 8 shows that compensation schemes for limited liability firms 
that lead to first best outcomes are not robust to the introduction of risk. Risk makes it 
impossible to know with certainty what the available financial resources will be ex post, 
and thus the set of feasible ex ante contracts is substantially reduced. When the 
constraints on the ex ante contracts brought about by risk are sufficiently severe, the 
limited liability firm may be better off offering profit-sharing contract similar to that 
granted by cooperatives. The cooperative is far less affected by risk. Profit sharing is a far 
more robust contract. Trust will emerge regardless of the presence or absence of risk.  
 
We conclude that globalization does not imply that the cooperative will be brought to an 
end. Although the competitive environment becomes tougher with globalization, the 
increased risk may hamper the ability of the limited liability firm to implement actions 
above those that the cooperativists will undertake. 
 
The case of Irizar illustrates the theoretical arguments we just presented. In 2001, Irizar 
was the most international cooperative in MCC, measured by international sales and 
countries where it commercialized its products. Irizar had plants in Brazil (1998), China 
(1995), India (2001), Mexico (1999), and Morocco (1998) and it was commercially 
active in 65 countries. The countries chosen reflected market opportunities as well as the 
cost of labor, an important input in coach body manufacturing (as opposed to the highly 
automated automobile body production). Brazil was the world’s largest luxury-coach 
market and India and China both had great potential. International plants were run by 
executives that had been promoted from inside Irizar. 
 
                                                            
10 This depends on  f , c , and parameters  p ,  H υ  and  L υ .   22 
As Irizar expanded globally, not only its profitability grew dramatically (see Table 1) but 
the company was also awarded several prizes for quality management, including the top 
annual prize granted by the European Foundation for Quality Management. 
 
Table 1: Irizar’s performance 
Sales
Internat. 
Sales
Add. Value/ 
worker
Workforce
Return on 
Sales
Return on 
Assets
Equity
Million € Million € Thousand € % % Million €
1991 18.6 3.2 16.8 225 n.a. n.a. 1.8
1992 23.5 4.6 31.3 290 n.a. n.a. 4.8
1993 25.9 17.5 32.5 280 7.5 12 6.0
1994 41.0 25.2 39.1 403 11 24 10.8
1995 56.4 28.8 54.7 515 16 34 19.8
1996 60.6 31.7 55.9 580 18 35 26.4
1997 64.4 25.5 54.1 570 19 37 38.5
1998 99.2 55.1 67.0 675 20 39 58.9
1999 124.1 76.0 75.0 796 21 41 80.5
2000 153.2 110.9 87.6 843 n.a. n.a. n.a.  
    Source:  Irizar internal documents 
 
Finally, as Irizar increased its global presence, democratic practices and wage equality in 
the Ormaiztegi plant have persevered.  
 
5.2 Mode of Expansion 
 
We now turn to the question of how are the cooperative and the limited liability firms 
likely to expand to meet the increase on demand brought about by globalization. To 
begin, we assume that there is no increase in risk and that there are plenty of potential 
workers in the international markets with no assets. We distinguish two cases: separable 
and non-separable production technologies. 
 
Suppose that technology is separable. By this we mean that a second organization can be 
set up that is completely independent from the original cooperative or limited liability 
firm. In this case, the cooperative and the limited liability firm will both expand by 
setting up multiple parallel operations in the form of limited liability firms. The 
cooperative will set up limited liability firms around the world. The reason is that the 
limited liability firm is more efficient and makes more money for the owner of the assets, 
regardless of whether it is a limited liability firm or a cooperative. However, if there is an 
increase in risk associated to globalization, the additional productive units may be set up 
as cooperatives, not limited liability firms. 
 
Now assume that the technology is not separable. The limited liability firm will pay the 
additional workers the cost of their effort and demand from them the first best level of 
effort. The cooperative cannot do this. The reason is that with this arrangement the   23 
cooperativists have an incentive to shirk (just a little) so that the additional workers end 
up getting the minimum possible wage. The new workers, anticipating this, decide no to 
join the cooperative. Thus, in the case of non-separability, a hybrid organization is not 
possible and the cooperative expands as a cooperative. The expanded cooperative will 
typically set α  for the members of the original firm substantially larger than to the new 
members. 
 
Will new cooperatives appear? This is unlikely if the cooperatives and limited liability 
firms from the developed country are wealth unconstrained. The workers in the 
undeveloped countries will have little incentive to set up cooperatives: either they have 
the money to set up a limited liability firm or they are better off working for somebody 
else. 
 
6. The Internationalization of MCC 
 
One of the basic objectives for all of MCC’s cooperatives for 2000-2004 was 
internationalization. Mr Cancelo explained: 
 
The traditional scheme worked well while business was simple: a few products, 
stable customers in a well-defined geographic area, and a well-understood and 
almost invariable competitive landscape. However, the world has changed: new, 
larger competitors are now fighting for a share of the local market. New, better 
products are introduced at a faster pace. New customers and suppliers crop up 
from countries that a few years ago we would have never even thought about. 
Guidance is not to be found in history; invariably, repetition of old strategies leads 
to failure. 
 
Mr. Jesús Ma Herrasti, MCC’s director for international operations, mentioned the 
following reasons for the internationalization of MCC: 
 
First, our clients are increasingly global and, thus, if we want to satisfy their 
demands we have to enhance our international presence. Second, in the last few 
years we have seen a reorganization of international capital markets leading to 
greater efficiency and access. As a consequence, there are new business 
opportunities in diverse geographic areas that we should not let pass. Third, to 
stay competitive MCC’s cooperatives need to locate certain activities where factor 
costs are low. For the most part, value-added activities will remain in the Basque 
Country but a number of labor-intense activities will be undertaken in other more 
advantageous geographic locations. Finally, we cannot close our eyes to the new 
international context: media, entertainment, finances, and all kinds of businesses 
are becoming increasingly global. As technology improves, physical distances 
become smaller and the information and knowledge that we have of each other is 
dramatically increased. 
 
MCC set up an international network of commercial offices to assist the cooperatives in 
their international development. Countries were chosen according to their market   24 
potential and economic and political complexity. In 2001, MCC had commercial offices 
in USA, Mexico, Brazil, Iran, India, and China. In addition, cooperatives wishing to 
expand internationally had access to low interest loans (fondos intercooperativos) 
provided by MCC. Also, cooperatives shared their international experiences with one 
another. 
 
Some thought that that globalization was fundamentally against MCC’s original goal of 
creating employment in the Basque Country. But, according to Mr. Cancelo: “The only 
way to ensure MCC’s survival in the Basque Country is by being present in the rest of the 
world. This is a must.” In addition, there was a lively debate within MCC on whether the 
globalization model adopted by the vast majority of cooperatives where foreign workers 
were not shareholder-partners was consistent with the original basic principles of the 
Mondragón cooperative experience. Mr. Herrasti concurred: 
 
Our forecast is that by 2004, one fourth of the Industrial Group’s workforce will be in 
international plants. If we do not act fast in incorporating these workers to our 
cooperative model we run the risk of winding up with a select nucleus of privileged 
shareholder-partners in the Basque Country and tens of thousands of wage-earners 
abroad. When we began our globalization process back in 1996, our main priority was to 
consolidate our international presence fast. As we achieve this objective, we need to 
reflect on how to implement a management model close, if not identical, to the 
Mondragón cooperative benchmark. We are known internationally for the success of our 
cooperative experience. We now face the challenge to also being recognized for having 
implemented a globalization paradigm coherent with our cooperative principles and 
values. 
 
 
6.1 Irizar’s International Strategy 
 
As a consequence of Irizar’s product strategy under Saratxaga, the company pursued 
international expansion aggressively. All of Irizar’s international plants were limited 
liability companies, not cooperatives. Among other reasons, directors cited the difficulty 
of exporting the cooperative model to countries lacking a tradition of democratic 
organization: “It is very hard for people in some of the target countries to grasp the 
concept of cooperativism where workers are owners and where decisions are made 
through mechanisms resembling democratic political institutions.” In addition, some of 
the countries had no law of cooperatives and, thus, cooperatives could not legally be 
constituted. Moreover, because equity joint venture was the main mode of 
internationalization and essentially all partners were limited liability companies, the 
natural legal form for the joint venture was that of a limited liability company. 
 
Finding individuals willing to leave the Basque Country was a challenge for most 
cooperatives in the MCC system and Irizar was not different. As a compromise, nearly all 
cooperatives sent executives overseas for a limited period of time, usually three years. 
For example, in July of 1998 Mr. Fabián Berridi from Irizar was sent to Botucatu, Brazil,   25 
to open the first Irizar plant in the American continent. Talking about his experience, Mr. 
Berridi observed: 
 
From the moment in which Irizar committed to a global strategy we all knew that 
someone would have to assume these kind of responsibilities. Among all of us at 
Irizar, a few people were more likely to be asked to lead this effort -- because of 
professional experience, age, family obligations, and what was expected from 
them. I was thrilled to have been given the opportunity to confront this challenge. 
However, with the exception of the professional dimension, I miss everything else 
from the Basque Country. 
 
 
7. Ruminations on Limitations and Alternative Explanations 
 
Selection stories – articulating what kinds of circumstances are conducive to employees 
getting together to form cooperatives – have appropriately received some theoretical 
attention, most notably in Miyazaki (1984). However, this model is inconsistent with the 
Mondragon evidence.  It predicts that cooperatives will form when prospects for the firm 
are dubious. Here, however, Irizar took on more of the characteristics of a cooperative 
(greater wage equality, most notably) at a time of expansion and did so profitably. 
Further, as its prospects have brightened, it has not turned away from being a cooperative 
– indeed, it is the poster child of success.  It is perhaps worth noting that there are lots of 
examples around the world of cooperatives that have thrived amidst global cooperation – 
Amul, the dairy cooperative in India; Felda the plantation cooperative in Malaysia, and 
the rising number of cooperatives in Finland. 
 
But perhaps a more general selection story is at work here – having to do with the 
structure of outside opportunities in the Basque country and the motivation for talent to 
remain at Mondragon.  It is true that Mondragon did particularly well when outside 
opportunities contracted in Spain in the 1990s.  This is consistent with Mondragon 
perhaps retaining talent more easily during this time. But the period of opening up of 
Spain to the world in the 1960s was also a time when outside opportunities in Spain 
expanded and Mondragon did well.  A pure selection story would have trouble 
reconciling itself with both these explanations.  
 
Further, our field interviews clarify two things. First, that there are strong emotional and 
nationalism-related reasons (support of Basque ‘nation’) why talent stays at Mondragon, 
suggesting that the economic selection effect is probably weakened and unlikely to 
provide the sole compelling explanation. Second, and consistent with this, we 
encountered quite a few senior managers who had relocated to the Basque country from 
more lucratic employment in well-known multinationals elsewhere in Spain and around 
the world, again casting doubt on the selection story. 
 
One could argue that this solidarity causes preferences among Basques to be reasonably 
well-aligned and, as Hart and Moore (1998) show, this alignment promotes the efficiency 
of cooperatives.  But note that, in their model, such preference alignment among   26 
cooperative members is exogenous – our focus is on modeling when cooperation – a 
plausible correlate of solidarity – arises.  Further, a pure nationalism story or ‘love of 
Basque culture/language’ story would not be able to explain time-series variation in the 
performance of Irizar and therefore would be ill-equipped to account for the effect of 
globalization on cooperatives and trust. 
 
One could also argue that Mondragon did well not because it was a cooperative but 
because it began to move away from its cooperative structure during the time of 
globalization. Proponents of this view would point in particular to the greater incidence 
of non-member workers at Mondragon in recent years.  This is precisely the implication 
of the Miyazaki (1984) model – that successful cooperatives will begin to dismantle 
themselves.  But it is not what seems to be going on at Irizar. And it is emphatically not 
the tone taken by Mondragon members – they see the arrival of outsider workers not as a 
plus of the evolution of their business model, but as a serious challenge to Mondragon’s 
viability. 
 
Finally is it the case that trust causes globalization (see Grief (1994), Kotkin (1993), 
Landa (1995), Rauch and Trinidade (2002)) at Mondragon, rather than globalization 
causing trust?  If this were the case, Mondragon would very much be organized as a 
cooperative in other countries, but it is not. The signature features of cross border 
diaspora networks emphasized by Greif for instance are not seen in Mondragon’s 
internationalization. We conclude that the likely causation behind our observed 
correlation indeed is from globalization inducing trust, and thereby greater performance. 
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